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EQUALIZATION
By Erl H. Ellis, of the Denver Bar
HEN the "History of the State Board of Equalization
of the State of Colorado" is written in an unabridged
and erudite form, undoubtedly the outstanding land-
marks in the development of the powers of the State Board
will be defined as the decision in the case of People v. Lothrop,
3 Colo. 428, and the final decision in the present series of cases
pending. At the moment this second landmark must be
announced as the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, rendered by Judge Phillips on October
17, 1929, in the three consolidated cases, in which the Union
Pacific, the Tramway Company and the Santa Fe were plain-
tiffs and certain Counties were defendants.
We can only attempt here a brief, profane sketch of the
background necessary for a fair realization of the import of
this recent decision.
Competitive Assessments
Let us call assessment the evaluation for tax purposes of
all the property of an individual taxpayer, be that taxpayer a
natural or an artificial being. Then, we remember that the
properties of public utilities and of corporations having a
continuity of plant, appurtenances and business in two or more
counties are assessed by a State Agency, are centrally assessed,
and that the properties are not assessed piecemeal in the sev-
eral counties. All other property is assessed locally by the
several County Assessors. This dual system of assessment
creates the possibility of competition between the two classes
of property and certainly is the claimed excuse for much dis-
cussion and oratory upon the question as to which class is not
assessed the closer to 100% full, cash, actual, real, market
value; or whatever our ideal is.
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Then we recollect that the major part of the State Rev-
enue comes from levies against these same assessments of prop-
erty made locally. Each County Assessor is therefore invited
to become the Champion of the taxpayers of his County to
see to it that, by means of low assessments, his County as a
whole shall not make too high a contribution to the state funds
and shall be valued (for tax purposes only) a little lower than
the neighboring counties. The certainty of "full valuations"
is not too apparent under this situation.
We further realize that on account of changing economic
conditions there is often an occasion for the owners of some
type of property to plead for lower valuations and there exists
the possibility of competition between classes of property,
even within a given county.
It has even been suggested that the Counties might be
interested in keeping the total valuation of the State at a low
level, for the county levies are generally unlimited, but the
State levy is definitely limited. Hence results a sort of control
over the total activities of the State and a practical brake upon
centralization of governmental powers in the State.
It was to control and solve all these nice little problems
that Section 15 of Article X of the Colorado Constitution was
written. This section creates and defines the powers of State
and County Boards of Equalization:. We purpose a short
inquiry here as to the powers under the Constitution, paying
no attention to any statutory powers which have been given
especially to the County Boards.
The See-Saw Decision
As originally written, the constitutional duty of the State
Board of Equalization was to "adjust and equalize the valua-
tion of real and personal property among the several counties
of the state". Quite promptly, in 1877, the State Board looked
over the county valuations and increased the valuations in
twenty counties and decreased them in four, but with a net
increase of over five million dollars in the state total assess-
ment. This certainly had the appearance of a fulfilling of
the duty imposed by the constitution, but Arapahoe County
was a stickler for local rights and asked the Supreme Court
what it thought about this action. The Court then wrote the
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famous decision of People v. Lothrop, 3 Colo. 428. The
action of the State Board was held invalid because equaliza-
tion can not mean changing the total State valuation. The
only power of the State Board was declared to be the right to
raise one group of counties and to then lower another group,
so that the total should remain unchanged. If one end of
the board goes up, the other end must come down. The
Board could get a lot of exercise in one place but could get
nowhere.
This decision quite efficiently squelched the State Board
and our State had no equalization for many years. The situa-
tion became rather desperate from the point of view of many.
A tearful appeal was made to the Supreme Court to reconsider
the Lothrop decision, but the Court regretfully declined yet
considerately pointed to the Legislature as a source of relief.
See In re Assessment, 25 Colo. 296.
The Legislature did on various occasions (especially
1889, 1891 and 1899) try to give power to the State Board to
raise or lower classes of property and to raise county totals.
In 1899 the State Board again made a serious attempt to ad-
just the valuations of different classes and types of property
in the several counties, but unfortunately for it the Supreme
Court again held its action invalid, deciding that only one
section of the statute pertaining to this subject could be in
force at one time; a very aggravated case of implied repeal.
People v Ames, 26 Colo. 126.
The Problem Solved
As far as these problems of equalizing classes of property
among the several counties are concerned, a double answer
was found. First the State Tax Commission was organized
with very broad powers over assessments and full control of
county assessors. The validity of the removal of the practical
power of assessment from the counties to the state agency was
approved by the Supreme Court in People v. Pitcher, 56 Colo.
343. This power is in the nature of assessment or reassessment,
but it is closely allied with practical equalization.
The true power of equalization still resided in the State
Board, so the Constitution was amended (1914) with the in-
tent of broadening that power. The amended Section 15 of
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Article X says that it is the duty of the State Board "to adjust,
equalize, raise or lower the valuation of real and personal
property of the several counties of the state, and the valuation
of any item or items of the various classes of such property".
The italicized words indicate the changes in the definition
of powers.
So, the Tax Commission recommending and the State
Board ordering, certain raises as to County valuations were
made in 1915 and were thoroughly approved and sanctified
by the Supreme Court. See People v. Pitcher, 61 Colo. 149.
Thus was practically ended this phase of the controversy.
Since then the counties have largely done as the Tax Com-
mission has recommended although there is still the possibility
that the State Board will not always agree with the Tax Com-
mission as to changes in valuations of classes of property in
a given County. We instance the case of Phillips County
obtaining reductions from the State Board in 1918.
A New Problem Arises
We have seen the solution of the old problems of equal-
izing and changing the values of classes of property. But did
this new definition of powers of the State Board offer a new
form of administrative relief to the taxpayer himself? Could
Mr. Jones of Burgville apeal to the Governor, the Secretary
of State, the Treasurer, the Auditor and the Attorney General,
sitting en banc for two weeks as a State Board, for a revalua-
tion of his three cows, his 40 acres of dry land and his alleged
improvements? And if Mr. Jones did convince the State
Board, without a view of the "premises", that the assessor had
seriously imposed upon him, could the State Board at the same
time of granting a decrease to Mr. Jones make an increase in
the assessment of Mr. Smith whom Jones reported was making
a lot of money on the stock exchange (ante Oct. 24, 1929).
Or how about the same sort of questions applied to cor-
porations or to public utilities which might present influential
evidence in favor of reductions? Or should the State Board
furnish the forum for the professional or conscientious ob-
jector to any existing taxation of Big Business?
The decreases obtained by various corporations have not
resulted in any serious question being raised. The following
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statements show the extent of the decreases granted by the
State Board in the years of 1915 to 1928, inclusive, to in-
dividual taxpayers:
Three of the larger railroad companies obtained reduc-
tions in 1915, 1916 and 1917 totalling $3,959,593. Applica-
tions of the interstate lines for reductions since 1917 have been
uniformly denied.
The local Colorado Short Lines have had some success
in this direction. Seven or eight such railroads have obtained
in this period a total of decreases in assessment amounting to
$6,127,290.
Some of the companies which the Tax Commission, in
making its assessments, calls "Local Public Utility Corpora-
tions" have also sought reductions. The total for five such
companies in reductions ordered by the State Board amounts
in said period of 'fourteen years to $26,727,502. One such
property has had its assessed value reduced in each of ten of
these years, a total of $14,739,352, while another property
accounts for a total reduction of $11,409,980 in four years.
But locally assessed companies have also appealed to the
State Board, especially in recent years. Total reductions made
by the State Board in county-made assessments have amounted
to $9,116, 453 in favor of about nine companies.
Thus the total decreases ordered by the State Board on
all assessments is $45,930,838. (Note: We think our totals,
based upon Tax Commission reports, are correct, but our or-
dinary figuring of our income tax return deals with smaller
figures).
Now how about increases? The story is shorter but it
brings us to the direct cause of the recent decision.
In 1915 the State Board for the first time considered
granting reductions to individual railroad companies. It
determined to so favor three companies to the amount of
$1,700,000, but it also resolved to add that amount to the assess-
ment of another company not appearing before it. However
this other railroad company learned- of this and was able to
induce the State Board to rescind its action.
In 1919 to 1922 inclusive, the State Board raised the
assessment of one railroad company a total of $1,167,690.
Apparently these increases were accepted.
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Then, at the end of the 1927 session, the State Board
announced that it had ordered reductions to the amount of
$3,717,900 and had also ordered increases in the amount of
$3,087,560. The increases were on properties of seven inter-
state public utilities and upon one local utility. The State
Board having adjourned before this action was made public
in any way, the companies affected by the increases had no
appeal to the State Board for a hearing, and the actions had
been taken without special notice to them and without any
complaint as to such assessments being filed with the State
Board.
Most of these companies paid the tax under protest so far
as it was based upon this increase over the Tax Commission
valuations, and then brought suits against the several counties.
Some twenty-four suits were brought, five being in the Federal
Court, as in each of those instances over $3000 in taxes was
involved. Demurrers were filed in all the cases. The Federal
District Court sustained the demurrers of the Counties in the
Federal cases. Three of these cases were appealed to the
Circuit Court of Appeals with the result that that Court held
that the State Board orders of increase were void and that
the demurrers should have been overruled.
The C.C.A. Decision
The reasoning and findings of the Tenth Circuit Judges
in holding that the State Board has no power to deal with in-
dividual assessments are indicated by the following quotations
from the opinion:
"It will be noted that the language (of the Constitution) is not 'item
of property' but 'item of a class of property'. We think the word 'item' is
here used in the sense of subclass."
"If the constitutional amendment should be construed to mean that
the State Board of Equalization should accomplish this purpose by examining
the assessment of each individual taxpayer and bringing the assessment of
each taxpayer up to 100% of the actual value of the property, an impossible
task would be imposed upon the State Board which by the statutes of the
State must complete its duties within the period of 15 days, including two
Sundays".
"Again valuing the property of a particular taxpayer as a whole is in
its essence assessment of such taxpayer's property, while dealing with and
raising or lowering the value of classes or subclasses of property without
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reference to ownership within a designated territorial limit is in its essence
equalizaton. Assessment is personal, while equalization is impersonal."
"While the broad language of the Supreme Court of Colorado, in
People v Pitcher, (61 Colo. 149) tends to support the contention of the
defendants, the holding of the court in that case went only to the extent of
sustaining an order which raised the valuation of classes and subclasses of
property and we do not think the court, by the language there employed,
intended to hold that the State Board of Equalization, under its constitutional
power, was authorized and required to examine into the valuation of the
property of individual taxpayers".
On account of this decision limiting the State Board to
pure equalization matters, no orders of either increases or de-
creases in individual assessments were made by the State
Board in 1929.
The Future
This Tenth Circuit opinion may not be final. It may
not be adopted by the Supreme Court of Colorado in other
cases which will presumably be appealed there.
This C.C.A. decision does not deal specifically with the
power of County Boards of Equalization. Certain County
Boards entered orders in 1929 raising the valuations of cer-
tain Utilities certified to them by the Tax Commission. The
State Board countermanded these orders. But suppose the
State Board had not done so, what would have been the result?
SHOULD RALPH FLEAGLE HANG?
By Philip S. Van Cise of the Denver Bar*
HERE has been a great deal of discussion among law-
yers and laymen, and in the public press as to whether
or not Ralph Fleagle should escape the death penalty
for the Lamar murders, in return for his confession clearing
up the whole tragedy.
There is no doubt in anyone's mind that if there ever
was a case in which capital punishment should be inflicted,
that case is the Lamar bank robbery with its resultant mur-
ders.
Four men had been: arrested in other states, charged with
this crime, positively identified by the eyewitnesses in the
bank, extradited to Colorado, and were awaiting trial with
almost certain conviction. Then a fingerprint was found
which identified Jake Fleagle as one of the bandits. Jake has
never been located, but Ralph Fleagle was arrested and
brought to Colorado. No eye witness to the crime could
identify him, (and no attempt was made at the trial so to do),
hence the evidence being circumstantial, only life imprison-
ment could be inflicted by the jury. Before a jury could re-
turn a hanging verdict, as the evidence stood before his con-
fession, Fleagle must make a legal confession or plead guilty.
His associates were unknown, and the authorities wanted the
entire matter cleared up at the earliest possible moment. The
State wanted a confession, Fleagle's attorney, and Fleagle,
wanted to save his neck, and conferences were held. Strange
to relate, though an agreement was made, it was not in writing,
lacked judicial approval-no order of Court being entered
thereon-and the parties thereto are in hopeless confusion as
to what they agreed upon!
The State's witnesses claimed that the agreement was
limited to a promise that the jury would not be asked to return
.EDrrWo's NorE: This article was written by Mr. Van Cise, a former and most
able district attorney for Denver, only with considerable reluictance and at the express
request of Dicta.
The issue tendered has been the subject of much debate, it is not without sig-
nificance, nor is it purely local in its scope.
As to the conclusion involved, Dicta draws closer the folds of the Editorial
Cloak and continues to think deep thoughts.
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a hanging verdict, the defendant's witnesses (including the
attorney general of Kansas and Chief of Police Harper of
Colorado Springs) that life imprisonment was the promise.
Until Fleagle talked, as matters then stood, Fleagle faced
life imprisonment at the most (and possibly an acquittal).
Would any lawyer advise his client to talk-and run the
chance of being hung-unless he had a promise that by talking
he would at least be as safe as if he had kept his own counsel?
We believe it a fair assumption that both Judge Cunningham
-the attorney for Fleagle-and his client honestly believed
that a promise of life imprisonment was made. And in making
this statement we do not mean to infer that their interpretation
of the contract was justified by the statements of the State,
only that such was their interpretation and belief, and the
reason why Fleagle's lips were unsealed.
Where does this leave the State of Colorado as a matter
of law, criminal practice, and equity?
Three charges were filed against Fleagle:
(a) Murder, which included both first and second de-
gree.
(b) Aggravated robbery, in which the Court alone fixes
the penalty at from ten years to life (C.L. 6718).
(c) Kidnapping, in which neither death nor life im-
prisonment was involved, simply a short time in the peni-
tentiary.
Fleagle pleaded guilty to all three, and to first degree
murder at that!
Under the statutes (C.L. 6665) the jury alone and no one
else can fix the penalty for first degree murder! No outside
agency of any kind can interfere with this exclusive preroga-
tive.
Many states have statutes authorizing a contract between
the State and a defendant, which can be pleaded in bar, and
afford a confessing defendant absolute protection. Colorado
has no such statute. How then can an agreement with the
State officials be made effective.
It is handled in one of four ways:
1. By a dismissal by the District Attorney, with the con-
sent of the Court.
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2. By accepting a plea of guilty to a lesser offense.
(Recommendation by the District Attorney and approved by
the Court).
3. By a written agreement entered into by the District
Attorney and specifically approved by the court by order
entered of record.
4. By an oral understanding between the State and the
defendant.
While none of the first three was in any manner attempted
in this case, and the fourth was indefinite, we will discuss
them in their order.
1. Dismissal or nolle prosequi.
Under the common law and in Colorado, until 1913, a
District Attorney had the absolute right, without the consent
of the court, to enter a dismissal or nolle prosequi. In 1913,
however, this was changed by statute (C.L. 7078) and no
dismissal can now be made except upon written motion in
open court with the consent and approval of the court. This
is no bar to subsequent prosecution, though in practice it dis-
poses of the case.
2. Acceptance of plea to lower offense.
This is a very common practice in all the Courts of Colo-
rado, where manslaughter is accepted for murder, simple
robbery for aggravated robbery, etc., and is an absolute bar
to a second trial for the greater offense.
3. Written agreement entered into by the District At-
torney and defendant and approved by the court.
In the Denver bunco cases immunity was given to Len
Reamey by a written agreement entered into between Reamey
and the Special Prosecutors and specifically approved by
Judge Butler, both in writing and by order of Court. After
Reamey fulfilled his agreement with the State his case was
dismissed.
Some states enforce an oral agreement, but the weight of
authority requires consent of Court. The reason for the rule
is well expressed in People v. Whipple, 9 Cow. 708, as follows:
"So long as, by the policy of the law, accomplices are deemed competent
witnesses against their fellows, so long must a discretion in regard to admitting
them be vested somewhere or other in the government. It could not, con-
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sistently with the nature of the power or the course and character of judicial
proceedings, be committed to the chief executive magistrate; nor could it,
with propriety, be intrusted to the public prosecutor or any other inferior
ministerial officer of justice, because, strictly speaking, it is the exercise of a
high judicial discretion; and the reasons for vesting it in the court, rather
than in the committing magistrate, or even the public prosecutor, is, that
the admission of the party as a witness amounts to a promise by the court
of a recommendation to mercy, upon condition of his making a full and fair
disclosure of all the circumstances of the crime."
4. Oral agreement between the State and the defendant,
without the approval of the Court.
Such an arrangement is of no value whatever in Colo-
rado, affords no protection to the defendant, an:d cannot be
offered in evidence. It also is dangerous, as it opens the door
of misunderstanding.
There is only one Colorado case on the subject, and while
not squarely in point it passes upon the power of the district
attorney. One Giano, long before Volstead days, was tried
and convicted of selling liquor. At the trial an offer of proof
was made that he had been previously tried for a similar
offense, and that a mistrial resulted, and that thereupon some
sort of an understanding was entered into between defendant
and the district attorney, whereby defendant was not to be
further prosecuted. This offer was rejected. The Court sus-
tained this ruling and stated:
"We are not aware that the District Attorney has the power to suspend
the operation of a statute or to make a valid agreement by which he is to
refrain from enforcing the criminal laws of the State * * * proof of such an
agreement, if made, was improper."
And this decision is in line with decisions elsewhere:
"The decided weight of authority sustains the doctrine that an agree-
ment to turn State's evidence, made with the prosecuting officer alone, without
the court's advice or consent, affords the defendant no protection in the event
he be placed on trial in violation of the agreement."
I Bishop's New Criminal Law, 9th Edition, 679.
This leaves only two propositions for discussion, what
should have been done to perfect an agreement, and what
should the State do under the present circumstances.
A written agreement could have been entered into under
which Fleagle pleaded guilty to both aggravated robbery and
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kidnapping and received life imprisonment on the former
and the maximum term of years on the latter. The agree-
ment could have been filed in the murder case, together with
a motion to dismiss, approved by the Court and contingent
upon full confession and disclosure by Fleagle and testimony
against his accomplices. Upon compliance with his bargain
the dismissal in the murder case would have been entered as
a matter of course and the matter disposed'of for all time.
Under the practice in this State (though it has not been
passed upon by the Supreme Court) many pleas of second
degree murder have been accepted by the Court though the
facts call for first degree murder. If a plea of guilty to second
degree murder had been accepted in this case, life imprison-
ment could have been imposed thereon by the judge without
a jury. Then an absolute bar would have been created to
further prosecution.
What Should the State Do?
Bearing in mind that the State had several innocent men
in jail awaiting trial on this Lamar murder charge-men who
had been positively identified as the murderers, that the State
could not hang Fleagle and did not know his confederates,
(except Jake), that by keeping quiet his neck was safe, while
by confessing he saved the State from probable judicial mur-
der of innocent men, cleaned up the whole tragedy, and
secured the conviction of his accomplices Abshier and
Royston, what should the State do?
Our most dangerous criminals are not individuals, but
organized gangs. What breaks them up and keeps their num-
bers small is not fear of the law-but of each other. The
ordinary man sneers at the man who turns state's evidence and
defendant's lawyers call him a sneak and a traitor. Yet he
is the greatest protection society has against gangdom, and
constitutes the greatest menace to the underworld. Police
officials, like Chief Harper of Colorado Springs, district at-
torneys and law enforcing agencies, all know that in order to
get results concessions of some sort must be made to some
criminals (and often to desperate ones) in order to enforce the
law. But before a law-enforcing officer can get this help
from a defendant he must "tote-square" with the underworld.
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Once it is known that the defendant has been double-crossed
by an official, that officer's usefulness to society is in a large
measure ended. [And we charge no state official in this case
with bad faith of any kind].
Fleagle, under the methods pursued in his case, has no
redress in law (unless for errors in the trial). His resort is
to the pardoning power for commutation to life imprison-
ment. What action the governor should take is clearly set
forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in U. S. v.
Ford, 99 U. S. 593, 25 L. Ed. 399-403, where the Court said:
"The accomplice acquires only an equitable right to the clemency of
the Executive * * * Should it be objected that the application may not be
successful, the answer of the court must be in substance that given by Lord
Denman on a similar occasion, that we are not to presume that the equitable
title to mercy which the humblest and most criminal accomplice may thus
acquire by testifying in a Federal Court will not be sacredly accorded to him
by the President, in whom the pardoning power is vested by the Federal
Constitution."
INVESTMENT TRUSTS
By Lowell White of the Denver Bar*
NVESTMENT trusts do not embrace any new principles
of investment, but are a new application of old principles
in a new field in the United States. An investment trust,
in its simplest form, is a mere association of investors who
place their funds under the control of a common manager for
investment. In this way the management is able, by the use
of large amounts of money, to spread the risk over a great
many securities embracing every field in our industrial and
financial scheme of affairs. Diversification is the cardinal
principle of sound investment. The man who has $100.00
or $1,000.00 to invest cannot spread this investment over very
many securities, especially if it is his desire to buy securities of
the leaders in, the various fields of industry. For instance, if
a man desires to buy shares in General Motors he would have
to pay $167.00 per share. If he wishes to buy shares in Atchi-
son, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, it would cost him $170.00;
American Tel. & Tel. costs in the neighborhood of $160.00,
and so on. The shares of many of the well known companies
are often called the "rich man's investment", and the man
of moderate means hesitates about putting so large a propor-
tion of his assets in the high priced shares. But very often the
high priced shares are cheaper in the long run than the low
priced shares. If the man with $100.00 or $1,000.00 is asso-
ciated with other investors so that the common fund amounts
to several hundred thousand dollars, or better yet, if the fund
amounts to millions, under capable management the common
fund can be so diversified to include securities of hundreds of
different companies, so that the investor of modest means, re-
gardless of how small his investment, has the advantage of
having his fund spread over a large field.
The investment trust idea not only has advantages for the
man of moderate means, but has many advantages for the
man of large financial resources. The wealthy man can do
for himself what an investment trust can do, if he will. How-
ever, to do this effectively, he must have sufficient leisure time
*An address delivered before the Law Club, March 2nd, 1927.
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in which to make a thorough study of the various proposed
investments and arrive at a conclusion that the same are not
overpriced, that there are sound values back of each invest-
ment, and that future prospects are bright. Second, a further
advantage to the rich man who has invested his funds in an
investment trust, is that he is assured of a constant check-up
upon his securities and he can devote his time to his principal
business in which he has demonstrated his ability to make a
fortune. Industry and finance in the world today are be-
comilng so complicated and of such magnitude that the invest-
ment, re-investment and management of large sums of money
demand the time and thought of people who are able and
willing to make that their principal occupation.
Further, thirty or forty states in this country levy inherit-
ance tax and transfer tax upon shares of corporations organ-
ized in those states. In his effort to spread the risk geographi-
cally the individual investor might acquire stocks of corpora-
tions domiciled in many different states, and his estate would
be liable to pay such a tax to those states in addition to the
payment of federal estate tax and inheritance tax of the state
of his domicile. Often there is some difficulty in obtaining
information and preparing papers for the transfer of stocks
in a number of foreign states. These difficulties would be
eliminated if the investor owned shares in an investment trust,
even though its holdings were comprised of securities of cor-
porations organized in every state in the Union and many
foreign countries.
The risks of investment are, first, the credit risk, and this
risk may be met by careful analysis as to the debtor company's
assets and liabilities, past and prospective earning power in
which a specialist's judgment is necessary to form a correct
conclusion. The second risk is the money risk. This includes
a factor which is seldom considered by investors and is very
often overlooked by bankers. As you all know, there is a
variability in, the purchasing power of the dollar from time
to time. No one is able to tell to a certainty at what time in
the business cycle a dollar can buy more than at other times.
This can be adjusted by making investments, part of which
will be affected favorably by the increase in purchasing power
and offset the effect on other investments which will be in-
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fluenced in the opposite direction. The only way to do this
is to divide the risk between those securities yielding a definite
income, such as bonds and preferred stock, and a proportion
of common stock whose yield has a tendency to increase over
a period of years, and whose earnings tend to increase when
commodity prices are soaring.
The third risk is the Act of God risk. Every day on the
face of the earth some person's investment is wiped out by
reason of floods, earthquakes, tornados, or some other catas-
trophe. Diversification will reduce such losses to the mini-
mum.
The fourth is the progress risk. Constantly we find re-
finements, improvements, inventions, changes in fashion, de-
velopment in laws which make old methods obsolete or out of
fashion. If a man should have his whole investment in some-
thing which goes out of date he will be faced with serious loss.
The fifth risk is that of market. As everyone knows, over
a period of years there are bound to be high and low points
in the market, and some believe that the highs and lows can
be forecasted by means of certain theories of the business
cycle. Many authorities do not believe in. this theory. Those
who have had some success in forecasting the changes in the
business cycles and managing investment trusts would do well
to borrow money when the market is low and make invest-
ments which can be sold when the market is high, and at that
point it would be advisable to invest the proceeds from these
sales in short term bonds because of the fact that the price of
short term bonds seldom fluctuates very much, because of the
early maturity. Another theory for investing of investment
trust funds is that, if money is continuously invested, securities
will be bought when the market is low as often as when the
market is high, and by the law of averages the investor would
have his money invested in, those securities at an average cost
well below the highest market price and during the next fol-
lowing bull market these securities could be disposed of at a
profit and would also have had a fair return in the meantime.
This can be done by providing for the investment in bonds
which will mature serially so that some of the bonds are ma-
turing each year, and if the funds are immediately invested,
DICTA
will then have the advantage of making investments during
all different conditions of the market.
Another advantage of having the funds in such shape so
that it is necessary for the management to invest continuously
is that the management must be on the alert and take cog-
nizance of current conditions and thus reduce the progress
risk. Frozen investment funds are at a disadvantage as com-
pared with fluid ones.
Another essential element to the success of investment
trusts of America is the management. The management should
be disinterested, in that it should not have connections with
people who are floating securities or promoting companies,
so that an impartial attitude can be taken on securities in
which the management contemplates a purchase. In England
most of the investment trusts are managed by lawyers or ac-
countants.
The standards and principles of an investment trust
should be well defined for two reasons; the first is that, if
properly formed, the resulting rules should not prove so much
a restriction upon the management as statements of standards
and methods, which would have the effect of making the judg-
ment of the managers more orderly and essentially more in-
telligent. The statement of the principles should be carefully
conceived and drawn. Otherwise, it may hamper the manage-
ment. The second reason is that the rules are not only neces-
sary for the protection of stockholders, but also the winning of
confidence of prospective investors. In this country invest-
ment trusts are a post-war development, and consequently,
very little is known about the idea by the average investor,
and if he is shown a clear statement of what the management
can do and cannot do he is more likely to invest his funds in
such an organization. There is not this necessity in England
because investment trusts have been operating there for forty
or fifty years, and have established such a unique place in the
confidence of the public that it is seldom that a new invest-
ment trust places any restriction upon the management except
to say that not more than 10% of the trust funds shall be in-
vested in any one security.
There are several kinds of diversification. First, is geo-
grap hical. One of the leading American investment trusts
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provides that no more than 75% of the funds of the trust
shall be invested in securities originating in the United States;
no more than 35% shall be invested in securities originating
in England; no more than 20% shall be invested in securities
of continental Europe, and so on. Then there can be a diver-
sification as to type of security. One pioneer investment trust
provides that 65% of its funds shall be in bonds, 29% in pre-
ferred stocks, and 6% in common stocks. The third is with
regard to industries; for this purpose one trust provides that
not more than 30% of the funds of the corporation shall be
invested in stock of banks, insurance companies and other
financial organizations; not more than 30% shall be invested
in railway, land, marine or transportation companies; not
more than 30% in public utilities; not more than 30% in in-
dustrial companies; not more than 50% in government and
municipal offerings, and not more than 20% in all other kinds
of securities. Another investment trust provides that the man-
agement is prohibited from purchasing a majority of any
issue. Most of them have some provision that not more than
1% to 5%, as the case may be, shall be invested in any one
security. One large and successful trust limits its investment
to not more than twenty stocks listed on the New York Stock
Exchange. The purpose of this limitation is that effective
supervision of the trust fund can be more readily had, as con-
trasted with the investment fund containing four or five hun-
dred different securities. However, this limits the applica-
tion of the principle of diversification, which is the most im-
portant factor in investing. There are some trusts that are
limited to public utilities only, and some which are limited to
railways. These trusts may have their special purpose, and
under effective and efficient management would undoubtedly
be successful. However, they do not serve the purpose of the
ordinary investor because, as in the past, the future will see
that certain industries, as a whole, suffer at certain periods,
as the railroads suffered for a few years after the war. If all
of one's investment funds are in any one group, the value and
yield of the trust must suffer as that particular industry suffers.
If the risk is spread over all, or most of the industries, the
slump of one industry may be more than counteracted by the
buoyancy of another industry.
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It cannot be promised that the managers of investment
trusts will not, from time to time, pick "lemons", and the fund
may suffer some losses. However, if only a small part of the
fund is invested in any one security the losses should be very
small and such losses can be prepared for in advance by setting
aside reserves to take care of these losses.
One trust provides that there shall be no investment made
in the securities of any company which has a capitalization
of less than twenty million dollars. Ordinarily, the larger
companies are better risks and more dependable information
can be obtained about these companies, but this again limits
the field, and always there are to be found many sound small
companies in which a more profitable investment can be made
because of the very nature of the company, and the greater
field of expansion and prospective increase in earnings.
The experience of continental Europe in relation to in-
vestment trusts has been unsatisfactory because of the tendency
to invest in promotions, and in most cases, as a result of this
practice, these trusts have failed. A provision that the secur-
ities shall have been listed on one of the major exchanges for
a period of one year or more, while rather a strict provision,
would have the effect of almost completely excluding promo-
tions and possibilities of directors profiting by purchasing
securities in any company in which they may be interested.
Moreover, the listing of a security on an exchange like the
New York Stock Exchange, carries some weight in the exten-
sion of credit, and signifies that certain standards have been
met, and assures available reports and other information.
In England, investment trusts are usually in the form of
a corporation, and in addition to the common shares, the trust
ordinarily issues debentures and preferred stock. The trusts
are so well established that seldom are the debentures secured
collaterally by the deposit of assets and are, therefore, nothing
more than mere unsecured notes. The English investment
trusts have had the advantage of being able to borrow money
between 3Y2 and 5%, and rarely has it been necessary for them
to pay 6%. The purchasers of investment trust bonds are
usually institutions and trustees who desire gilt edge security.
With increasing confidence in investment trusts in America
the day may come when the bonds of investment trusts will
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be made legal for trusts funds. In that event, the market for
investment trust securities will be increased and broadened,
the expense of marketing these securities will be lessened and
the interest rate to be paid will be lowered. At present, the
so-called legals, in my opinion, are greatly over-priced and
make a poor investment. Usually a premium is paid for the
so-called legals because of their inherent soundness. There
are many other securities which can be bought which cannot
be classified as legals but, practically, are as sound for all
purposes of the average investor. One of the advantages of
an investment trust for its shareholders is that an efficient
organization should be able to determine the risk back of each
security and buy at bargain prices those which are sound, but
are not appreciated marketwise by the in-vesting public. The
equity of the common shareholder in English investment trusts
may be considered by some as being thin because of the fact
that very often the trusts borrow, by means of issuance of de-
bentures, in a sum equal to five times the amount of money
invested by common shareholders, and then issue preferred
stock in the amount of three times the value of the fund con-
tributed by the common shareholders. But this is of ad-
vantage to the common shareholders, if properly managed, in
that the money borrowed will yield a substantial increase over
the interest charges.
Before the war, America was essentially a borrowing
country, most of the funds of this country were employed in
various business ventures, and no large amount of money was
available for domestic or foreign investments; this is one of the
reasons for the slow development of .the investment trust idea
in this country. Since the war, the accumulation of large re-
sources and immense wealth has made the United States prin-
cipally a lending country, now seeking a place for the invest-
ment of its surplus funds.
Another reason why the investment trust idea has not
been developed earlier in this country is the ruaged inde-
pendence of the American and the gullibil.ity of the average
investor, who has been in the habit of making his own decisions
and basing these decisions upon the alluring prospects of var-
ious get-rich-quick schemes, which have been promoted by
direct contact with the investor himself by means of mail and
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personal solicitation. Staggering sums of money have been
lost by the American public because of this attitude, but on
the other hand, there is a greater diffusion of stocks and bonds
throughout this country than in any other country in the
world. In England it has been the practice of the investor to
follow the advice of the bankers in making his investments
and, fof that reason, it has been easier for the investment trust
idea to grow.
Before the world war it was the practice of English in-
vestment trusts to borrow funds at not more than 5% and make
investments in American securities which would yield them
seven or eight per cent. On large sums of borrowed money
this item alone yielded a very substantial profit for the com-
mon shareholder.
Some of the peculiar elements of safety of an investment
in investment trusts bonds are that the assets of an investment
trust are readily marketable and, in the case of receivership,
the assets can usually be disposed of at book value or at a
greater price.
If there is a wide diversification of securities the trust, in
all probability, would not hold a block of any one security
which would be sufficient to depress the market if sold, while
in the winding up of the business of almost any other corpora-
tion it is usual that a forced sale of its assets results in the re-
ceiver obtaining much less than the intrinsic value. After a
business has lost its earning power its value as a going concern
has become so depreciated that even its fixed assets, which may
be valuable for one purpose only, will not find a buyer who is
willing to pay anywhere near the book value of those fixed
assets. Further, the costs and expenses of a receiver would
not be nearly so great in winding up the affairs of an invest-
ment trust, which carries in its portfolio marketable securities,
as would be the expense in the case of the winding up of the
business of an industrial company. Another advantage is that
upon receipt of funds from the issue of bonds or stock the
money can immediately be placed on an earning basis. This
is not true of the ordinary corporation. For instance, Famous
Players-Lasky Company issued a large amount of additional
stock during the summer of 1926 and received the money
therefor at that time. That money has not as yet been entirely
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put to work, and as a result, the balance sheet of that company,
which will appear shortly, will show a large decrease in the
per share earnings of the company. The same is true of any
company which must use the money so received in an expan-
sion program which involves the building of fixed assets.
The investor who wishes to have the advantage of an in-
creasing return should not invest in bonds or preferred stock
of an investment trust, but should buy common shares. Some
companies issue a unit-one share of preferred stock and one-
half share of common stock-in order that the investor may
have a fixed return from preferred stock and, in addition, have
the advantage of an increasing return which may be made
available by the profitable operation of the company. How-
ever, it would seem that if the investor is permitted to sep-
arately dispose of either one of these securities the purpose
would be defeated.
It is interesting to note to what a degree diversification
is affected in England by the investment trust companies.
Many of the investment companies in England have as many
as 400 to 873 distinct securities in their investment portfolios.
The company having the 873 investments is represented by a
capital of six million pounds. The average investment of
British trusts is about 40% in bonds, debentures, and guaran-
teed stocks; 18% in preferred stock; and 42% in ordinary or
common shares.
One of the pioneers in this field in America has invested
in 552 distinct securities in 407 organizations, 45 of which
are railways, 65 public utilities, 202 industrial companies, 52
foreign corporations, and 43 government or government sub-
division issues.
Diversification, although the biggest factor in successful
investing, should not be carried to a point beyond the capacity
of an analytical and statistical staff. There is in England
what is known as a British Trusts Association. The stock-
holders of this company are 92 investment trusts. The pur-
pose of this association is to gather information which will be
of value to its shareholders and also carry on an underwriting
business.
At this time two types of investment trusts are growing
up in America. One is the fixed trust. An investment com-
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pany of this type is allowed to buy shares in certain named
corporations, then the certificates for these shares are deposited
with the trust company, which latter company issues against
the deposited stock what are termed collateral trustee shares
or investment trust certificates. In some cases the investment
corporation has no right to substitute stocks other than those
in the published list. Others are permitted to sell the under-
lying stocks and make substitution under certain conditions,
and from a restricted list. The investment corporation itself
makes its profit on the sale of certificates or by receiving an-
nual commissions upon the increase in value of the certificates,
if any.
The management type of investment trusts is the second
form and, in my opinion, is likely to be the more popular.
Under this type there are no collateral shares, but the investor
buys stock in an operating corporation whose business happens
to be that of investing its money in securities. The business
is conducted as any other business. The directors may be
limited in the scope of their activities by the Articles of In-
corporation, or they may be given free rein to follow any
course which, in their opinion, may be most profitable to the
stockholders. The corporation will be in a position to set
aside reserves for losses and contingencies, use excess earnings
to increase the value of its stock, and in all respects is much
more flexible than a fixed trust. It will be in a position to
borrow money and the common share owners will obtain the
benefit from such action. While the owners of certificates in
a fixed trust are not in a position to benefit by borrowed money,
under good management this type of trust should be ideal for
a portion of an investor's funds.
There is every reason why investment trusts should flour-
ish in the United States. From an ideal standpoint, nothing
holds so much promise of profit and protection of the investor,
large and small. However, the public needs to be vigilant to
prevent the misuse of the plan and to encourage adoption of
sound practices and principles.
COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(Ewr'oRt's NoTE.-It is intended in each issue of DICTA to print brief abstracts of
the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be-printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such ac-
tion being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)
APPEAL AND ERROR-SCIRE FACIAS-No. 12329-Reno vs.
Swadley-Decided September 23, 1929.
Facts.-Judgment below for defendants in error was
rendered March 14, 1928. On March 12, 1928, Reno lodged
the case in the Supreme Court on error and a scire facias was
issued, returnable in twenty days. It was not served on the
defendants in error and no return of service has been made.
On May 4, 1929, counsel for defendants in error receipted for
four copies of the abstract of record, and on June 5, 1929 for
six copies of the brief of plaintiff in error, Reno. Reno now
contends that these receipts constituted a general appearance
of defendants in error.
Held.-Reno's contention is unsound. If a scire facias
or summons to hear errors cannot be served on defendants in
error as required by the Rules of the Supreme Court, the plain-
tiff in error should either apply to the Court for relief or ob-
tain consent of the defendant in error for an extension.
Writ Dismissed.
ASSIGNMENT OF LEASE IN GOVERNMENT PERMIT-NO. 12155
-Ratcliff vs. Miller-Decided June 17, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff sold to the defendant certain cattle and
farm equipment, and assigned the right to use certain cattle
brands. Also, sold and assigned certain cattle grazing priv-
ileges on a forest reserve, and leased for a term of years certain
ranches. The defendant sold the cattle, and declared that
they would permit the cattle grazing privileges to lapse.
Whereupon the plaintiffs bring this suit asking that the de-
fendants keep the grazing privileges in force.
Held-Under the rules of the Secretary of Agriculture
a grazing privilege is not a property right, and is not appur-
tenant to the land, and that therefore there was no obligation
to keep the privileges in force.
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CHANGE OF COUNTY SEAT-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-No.
12,330-People vs. County Commissioners of Chaffee
County-Decided September 16, 1929.
Facts-Suit was brought to prevent the changing of the
county seat of Chaffee County from Buena Vista to Salida.
The contest depends upon the question of registration of elec-
tors in eight precincts in Salida. Section 2, Article 14, of the
state constitution makes certain limitations for the removal of
county seats and provides for legislative action on this subject.
In 1881 the legislature passed an act under this provision, re-
lating to change of county seats. It was contended that this
statute was at least impliedly repealed by the 1917 act con-
cerning elections generally, in which the procedure, officials
and qualifications of electors are different from the act of
1881; that this election was attempted to be held under the
1881 act; and that the alleged registration of voters under this
act was no registration at all.
Held.-The 1881 act was passed under a direction of the
constitution on the special question of removal of county seats.
The 1917 act is general in its terms, and does not either ex-
pressly or impliedly repeal the 1881 act. Therefore, the elec-
tion here questioned was properly conducted.
Judgment Affirmed.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE - COMPROMISE - NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE-No. 12,406-Staley and Startzell, co-partners,
etc. vs. Nazarenus-Decided October 7, 1929.
Facts.-One Hoops sold an automobile to Nazarenus,
who gave back a mortgage which was transferred to the plain-
tiffs, doing business as the Guaranty Finance Company. Naz-
arenus then returned the automobile to Hoops and alleges that
the Finance Company participated in the settlement, took a
new mortgage from the new owner of the car, agreed to return
Nazarenus' note, and that these things were done in compro-
mise of a disputed claim. The company retained the note and
brought this action upon it. Nazarenus filed a cross complaint
for damages for the failure to return his note and had judg-
ment. The company then filed a motion for a new trial,
alleging that they had discovered new evidence, but the mo-
tion was denied.
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Held.-This was a settlement of a disputed claim and
evidence concerning it was properly admitted. The motion
for new trial was properly denied, because there was no show-
ing of plaintiff's diligence or excusable error.
Judgment Affirmed.
CHATrEL MORTGAGES--REPLEVIN-NO. 12352-Brown vs.
Driverless Car Co.-Decided June 24, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff held a chattel mortgage upon a certain
automobile, executed by one Thomas. Thomas transferred
the title to the automobile to the Hopper Motor Company,
free of liens. The evidence showed that plaintiff knew of the
transfer and consented thereto. Hopper Motor Company
transferred the title to the defendant, free of liens. The chattel
mortgage not having been paid the plaintiff brings a Replevin
action.
Held.-That Replevin is the proper remedy to recover
possession of mortgaged property, but in the instant case the
mortgagee having expressly consented to the sale by the
mortgagor, the mortgage is void as to third parties.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT-UNCONSTITUTIONAL ORDINANCE
-PUBLIC POLICY-PARI DELICTO--No. 12,163-Menzel
vs. Niles Company-Decided October 7, 1929.
Facts.-One Bates owned two groups of lots-one group
facing west on Steele Street, the other facing east. An ordin-
ance provided that no apartment house for more than four
families should be erected unless a majority of the property
owners on both sides of the street consented. Bates desired to
build such an apartment house on the lots facing west and the
property owners in the block consented after Bates had agreed
to provide suitable parking and trees around the apartment
house *(and had also agreed that only dwelling houses of a
certain type should be erected on the opposite lots.) Niles
Company, by mesne conveyances, became the owner of the
lots facing east and brought this action to determine the
validity of the agreement between Bates and the property
owners. Prior to the beginning of this suit, the ordinance re-
*The facts in brackets were furnished by Mr. Barnwell S. Stuart, of counsel
for defendant in error, and do not appear in the opinion of the Court.
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quiring the property-owners' consent was declared unconsti-
tutional.
Held.-Although in form under the declaratory judg-
ments act, the case is essentially one to quiet title against any
claims under Bates' agreement with the property owners. The
ordinance having been found unconstitutional, there was no
consideration for the agreement, which is moreover, contrary
to public policy. Even if the parties are in pari delicto, the
public interest requires that relief be granted Niles Company,
and the title to the lots in question is therefore quieted in the
company.
Judgment Affirmed.
JUVENILE JUDGE - USURPATION - RIGHT TO SALARY - No.
12132-Graham vs. Lindsey-Decided September 16, 1929.
Facts.-In an action under the code usurpation act, the
Denver District Court held that Lindsey was entitled to the
office of Juvenile Judge in Denver. The Supreme Court re-
versed this decision, and the District Court then found that
there had been frauds in the election for the disputed office,
that Lindsey was not elected, and that Royal R. Graham was
elected. During the case's pendency in the Supreme Court,
Royal R. Graham died and his widow and administratrix of
his estate was substituted as relator; thereafter she brought this
action to recover from Lindsey the salary from the beginning
of the January term after the election to Royal R. Graham's
death. Lindsey defends on four grounds: (1) That Graham's
title to the disputed office had never been established; (2) that
the right to have this title ascertained abated with Graham's
death; (3) That Graham could not have been inducted into
the office by virtue of the Supreme Court's writ of quo war-
ranto; and (4) that Graham was not qualified under the law
to hold the office.
Held.-(1) Graham's title to the office is res judicata
under the second decision of the District Court in this case;
(2) the right to hold the office, but not the right to an adjudica-
tion of the right ceased at Graham's death; (3) there is no
merit in defendant's third and fourth contentions.
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded.
DICTA
PERSONAL INJ URIES-AUTOMOBILES---EVIDENCE-No. 12071
Schneider vs. Ingalsbe-Decided September 23, 1929.
Facts.-Ingalsbe started to walk across Interocean Aven-
ue, in the town of Holyoke, about six o'clock on a November
evening. She saw Schneider's car coming from her right at a
distance of about 400 feet, and also another car coming from
her left. She did not know how fast Schneider's car was com-
ing, but knew that a town ordinance limited speed on this
street to ten miles per hour. The evidence indicated that
Schneider was driving about 40 miles an hour. He alleges
that Ingalsbe was guilty of contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law in not continuing to look in his direction after she
first saw him approaching.
Held.-Ingalsbe had a right to assume that Schneider
was driving at a legal rate of speed; that he would use ordinary
care in approaching the cross-walk which she was using; and
that if he did so she would reach the opposite side of the street
safely.
Judgment Affirmed.
PRACTICE-FINAL ORDER-No. 12383-Martin vs. Way-
Decided July 1, 1929.
Facts.-An action was brought to enjoin the Treasurer
of San Juan County from issuing a treasurer's deed to certain
property. The defendant filed a general demurrer which was
overruled, and a temporary injunction issued. The defendant
stood on his demurrer and brings the case to the Supreme
Court upon application for supersedeas.
Held.-It was incumbent upon the defendant to have
final judgment entered before taking the case to the Supreme
Court, as no writ of error will lie unless there is a final judg-
ment, and a temporary injunction is not a final order.
WATER RIGHTS-INJUNCTION-No. 12127-Handy Ditch
Co. vs. Greeley & Loveland Irrigation Co.-Decided June
17, 1929.
Facts.-An action was brought by the plaintiff to restrain
the defendants from interfering with plaintiff's use of water.
Plaintiff owns the right to use a certain amount of water from
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the river. They also own five large storage reservoirs, and no
priorities for the storage. They seek to temporarily impound
more water in their reservoirs, and use later in the season on
the claim that the impounding is temporary and that they are
only withdrawing their direct appropriation.
Held.-The plaintiff is entitled to its direct appropria-
tion, but having no appropriation for reservoir purposes it
cannot claim any storage rights, as the storage of water would
interfere with the rights of other appropriators.
WILLS - CONSTRUCTION - DISCRETION OF EXECUTOR-No.
12,416-Stuart vs. U. S. National Bank-Decided Septem-
ber 16, 1929.
Facts.-This is an action for judicial construction of a
will. Plaintiff and testator Stuart were married in 1873. They
had three children, and were divorced in 1899. In 1923 testa-
tor executed his will providing that his executors should pur-
chase for plaintiff a life maintenance in some reliable Old
Ladies' Home, in the selection of which and in the determina-
tion of the amount to be paid for her relief, the decision of
the executors should be conclusive. This provision was di-
rected to be a first and prior charge on the estate after the pay-
ment of debts and expenses. The other beneficiaries are dis-
tant relatives of the testator. Plaintiff alleges that her health
will not permit her to live in an Old Ladies' Home and asks
that she be supported outside of such a home. She has not made
the other beneficiaries parties to this suit, and the executor's
demurrer for defect of parties was sustained in both the
County and District Courts.
Held.-The will makes this provision for plaintiff a prior
charge on his estate and solely within the discretion of his exe-
cutors. The other beneficiaries are, therefore, not necessary
parties, and the executor is directed it may provide for plain-
tiff outside of an Old Ladies' Home and that it can be called
to account only for a clear abuse of the discretion vested in it.
Judgment Reversed.
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WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION - PRACTICE - No. 12335-On-
tario Mining Company vs. Industrial Commission-De-
cided June 17, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff was employed to assist Ebersole who
contracted to construct an "upraise" on defendant's mining
property. Plaintiff was injured in connection with said em-
ployment. Plaintiff and Ebersole entered into an agreement
whereby Ebersole was to pay $500 in full settlement of all
claims and did pay $200. Plaintiff later filed a claim with
the Commission. The Commission awarded compensation to
the plaintiff. A rehearing was asked on two grounds. First,
that the commission had no jurisdiction. Second, that the
plaintiff in signing the agreement and accepting $200 had
practiced fraud by filing a claim with the commission. A re-
hearing was granted and thereafter the commission again made
its award.
Held.-That there was no fraud of which the courts
should take notice, because both parties entered into an agree-
ment which was illegal under the law, which makes settle-
ments between the parties subject to the approval of the com-
mission. This settlement was not submitted to the commis-
sion, and the company was waiving its right to raise the ques-
tion of the failure of the plaintiff to file his claim with the
commission within six months by applying for a rehearing,
which was granted. The defendants submitted to the juris-
diction of the commission.
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